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The unfolding of the crisis in the Eurozone can be explained by the interaction of institutional 
features and policy failures, and by their interconnection with real and financial imbalances. The 
crisis has shown that internal divergence in the EZ is based on important structural components 
which are unsustainable in the long run. Indeed, the crisis has magnified the gap between the 
vulnerable  peripheral  member  countries  and  a  more  resilient  core. The  paper  analyses  those 
factors that opened the way to the diffusion of the financial and economic crisis in the Eurozone. 
It  also  discusses  the  structural  consequences  of  these  events  and  critically  analyses  the 
institutional and political reforms which the Eurozone is facing in order to enhance its capability 
to cope with external shocks. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The international crisis has hit hard the Eurozone (EZ) and shows remarkably distinct patterns 
among its countries. The EZ, and hence the Euro, has shown to be highly vulnerable to external 
shocks, suffering of deep-seated as well as new structural and financial imbalances. At the same 
time, the EZ’s ability to cope with its economic vulnerability has been weak, revealing rigid 
decisional procedures. Coordinated policy responses have been slow. However, the crisis has 
given an important push to coordination of economic policies and instruments. 
The unfolding of the crisis in the EZ can be explained by the interaction of institutional features 
and policy failures, and by their interconnection with real and financial imbalances. The aim of 
this paper is to analyse those factors that opened the way to the diffusion of the external shock 
wave in the EZ and triggered the systemic crisis of the. It also aims at discussing the structural 
consequences of these events and critically analyze the institutional and political reforms which 
the EZ is facing in order to enhance its capability to cope with external shocks. 
The  crisis  has  shown  that  internal  divergence  in  the  EZ  is  based  on  important  structural 
components which are unsustainable in the long run. Indeed, the crisis has magnified the gap 
between  the  vulnerable  peripheral  member  countries  and  a  more  resilient  core.  Increasingly 
accepted within the current debt crisis setting, the need for real convergence has never been really 
pursued in the EZ. Not at the national level, at which a short term national view has often 
outweighed more structural programmes, and not even at the European level, where the process 
stopped whenever there was a strong political obstacle to overcome, regardless how problematic 
was the stopping point. In this context, severe are the risks of tinkering with existing institutions 
slightly adjusted. 
The next section deals with the unfolding of the crisis in the EZ, discussing the linkages among 
the United States and the EZ, the common weaknesses which caused synchronized shocks in the 
United States and in the EZ, and the idiosyncratic factors that characterize the systemic crisis of 
the euro. Section 3 analyses those aspects which are critical in shaping EZ vulnerability and its 
response to external shocks: the distinctive features of European capitalisms, the institutional 
architecture which leads to differential shocks in different countries and the divergent economic 




2.  The Global Crisis and the EZ: External Shocks, Global Weaknesses, and Domestic 
Vulnerability 
 
In the United States the crisis unfolded from a prolonged period of excess credit, the outcome of 
accommodating monetary and fiscal policies (Quinn Mills 2010; Razin and Rosefielde 2011). In 
the EZ the moving cause has been mostly external, i.e. imported from the United States through 
financial, real, political, and psychological linkages. The international transmission of the USA 
financial  and  economic  crisis  is  thus  often  understood  as  a  contagion  process.  No  shared 
definition has yet been reached by the literature on the controversial notion of contagion, which 
encounters serious problems across theory and empirical work. The question which is useful to 
briefly recall here is the fundamental distinction, upheld by most of the literature on financial 
contagion (Calvo and Reinhart 1996; Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000 and Eichengreen, Rose and 
Wyplosz 1996), between a) the development of synchronized shocks in different countries, which 
are due to similar structural vulnerabilities rather than to the presence of channel of contagion 
and  b)  the  cross-country  transmission  of  shocks.
1  As  to  the  latter,  this  literature  further 
distinguishes between fundamentals-based contagion, which occurs when the infected country is 
linked to others via trade or finance, and true contagion which takes place when common shocks 
and all channels of potential interconnection are absent (Calvo and Reinhart 1996). 
Many EZ banks were in fragile state when entering the sudden financial arrest (Caballero 2009) 
and  then  the  Irish  and  Greek  crises,  due  to  easy  credit  and  massive  adoption  of  financial 
innovation, high leverage ratios, circumvention of financial regulation and high risk investments. 
Moreover,  the  house-price  bubble  burst  wasn’t  the  mere  consequence  of  the  US  subprime 
mortgage crisis, but rather the burst of home grown bubbles. In the unfolding of the crisis in the 
EZ, the asymmetric presence of the aforementioned elements among different countries, and the 
interconnection of these aspects with institutional idiosyncrasies and policy failures, both at the 
national  and  at  the  European  level,  are  critical.  Domestic  imbalances  and  other  forms  of 
structural  and  policy  vulnerability  (e.g.  accumulated  public  and  private  debt  stocks,  markets 
rigidity,  unemployment  structure,  demography,  inequalities,  fiscal  policies  and  the  differential 
domestic effect of the common monetary policy) have played an important role in explaining the 
differential vulnerability and resilience, and hence performance of distinct European countries.   
From this standpoint, it is important to single out (1) the fundamental linkages among the USA 
and EU, which constituted the channels of transmission of external shocks to the EZ; (2) the 
                                                           
1 In line with the restrictive definition of the World Bank which depicts contagion as the transmission of shocks to 
other countries beyond any fundamental link among the countries and beyond common shocks. 4 
 
common weaknesses which fuelled synchronized shocks in the US and in the EU; (3) those 
idiosyncratic factors that let the Greek crisis open the way to a systemic crisis of the euro; and 
how those aspects interact. 
Both  financial  and  real  linkages  between  the  USA  and  the  EU were  important. The  money 
market sudden arrest (Caballero 2009), the fact that European financial institutions held a large 
share of assets based on US residential mortgage and thus shared in the losses that arose once the 
US  housing  bubble  burst,  the  sequence  of  falls  in  the  stock  market,  all  led  to  a  substantial 
shrinking of bank credit. Export to the US market, which counted for 23,2% of total EU exports 
in 2006, started decreasing in 2007 at an annual average rate of 5,1% between 2005 and 2009 
(Table 1). 
 
Table 1: EU Trade with the USA (millions of euro; %) 
Period  Imports  Variation 
(%, y-o-y) 
Share of total 
EU Imports 
(%) 
Exports  Variation 
(%, y-o-y) 
Share of total 




2004  159,374       235,499       76,124  
2005  163,511  2.6   13.9  252,683  7.3   24.0  89,172  
2006  175,547  7.4   13.0  269,144  6.5   23.2  93,598  
2007  181,739  3.5   12.7  261,477  -2.8   21.1  79,738  
2008  186,772  2.8   11.9  250,124  -4.3   19.1  63,352  




   -0.6         -5.1        
Source: Data DG Trade, 15 September 2010 
 
The strong real appreciation of the euro before 2008 significantly hampered export. At the same 
time, the increasing volatility of other currencies and of the price of commodities has had an 
adverse  impact  on  the  European  economy.  The  economic  slowdown  activated  automatic 
stabilizers,  increasing  social  spending  and  decreasing,  at  the  same  time,  government’s  fiscal 
revenues. 
However, as aforementioned, common excesses characterized the USA and the EU and fueled 
synchronized shocks: the housing bubble, massive circumvention of poor financial regulation, 
high  financial  leverage,  risky  financial  innovation  and  investments  in  high  risk  assets.  These 
factors  show  different  trends  in  the  different  member  countries,  testifying  of  a  composite 
scenario. 5 
 
The burst of the housing price bubble (Figure 1) played an important role in the EZ crisis.  
 
Figure 1: Residential Property Price Index, EU 16 (new and existing dwelling)  
 
Source: European Central Bank, data 2011 
 
In Spain, Ireland, Britain, Iceland, Estonia and Lithuania house prices had been steadily and 
sharply  growing  from  the  end  of  the  90ies  to  2006,
2  as  shown  by  the  house  price  indices 
published by the Economist since 2002. The journal, in a telling article titled ‘The worldwide rise 
in house prices is the biggest bubble in history. Prepare for the economic pain when it pops’ (16 
June 2005), reported that since 1997 home prices in most countries rose by much more in real 
terms than during any previous boom. Between 2004 and 2005 the prices of the houses grew at a 
rate of 9% or more in Italy, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden, reaching in Spain and France annual 
growth rates of over 15%, a much faster pace than those in the rest of Europe and in the USA. 
The growing house prices-rents ratio is a compelling evidence of the general overvaluation in the 
housing market. The trend was reversed in Germany, where house prices had steadily declined 
                                                           
2  House-price  inflation  slowed  significantly  in  2004  in  Ireland,  having  anyway  reached  impressively  high  levels 
throughout the observed period. 6 
 
between 1997 and 2010 (Table 2). The Economist’s measure of fair value in housing, which 
compares the ratio of house prices to rents in a country to its long-run average, shows a ratio in 
Germany well below its long-run average in the first quarter of 2010.  
 
Table 2: The Economist House-Price Indicators (% change) 
  1997-2005  Q1 2005  Q1 2010  Q4 2008  1997-2010  Under (-)/over (+) 
valued, Q1 2010    on a year 
earlier 
on a year earlier 
Britain  154  5.5  9.0  -14.9  180  31.2 
Sweden  84  10.0  5.6  -2.0  159  37.0 
Germany  -0.2  -1.3*  -0,4  1.1  na  -14.6 
Netherlands  76  1.9  -2.0  -5.4  86  20.4 
Belgium  71  9.4  -3.0  2.7  149  30.9 
Italy  69  9.7  -4.1  1.1  96  13.1 
France  87  15.0  -4.3  -3.0  133  39.7 
Spain  145  15.5  -6.3  -3.2  166  53.4 
Denmark  58  11.3  -13.1  -10.9  91  17.5 
Ireland  192  6.5  -18.5  -9.7  142  24.5 
Source: Authors’ compilation, Data The Economist  
*average 2004 
 
In the context of the single monetary policy and thereby of uniform interest rate policy, the 
uneven inflation rates which have characterized EZ member countries (Table 8) lead to different 
real interest rates which might have fuelled different borrowing based investments in housing 
among  the  Member  States. This  might  have  encouraged  the  substantial  surge  in  private and 
foreign debts experienced in Eastern and Southern European countries before the crisis onset. 
Germany shows a different trend, with declining private debt. 
As Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) empirically test on data spanning over two centuries for more 
than 70 countries, private debt increase, fueled by both domestic banking credit growth and 
external borrowing, is a recurrent antecedent to domestic banking crises, which, in turn, tend to 
precede or accompany sovereign debt crisis. The sequence of the events in the EZ is not an 
exception. What is peculiar is the unfolding of these trends within the EZ system.  
In the EZ household debt increased from 52% to 70% of GDP from 1999 to 2007, while 
financial institutions increased their debt from less than 200% of GDP to more than 250% (De 




Figure 2 Private and Government Liabilities in the EZ (% GDP) 
 
Source: De Grauwe, 2010 
These aggregates cover inter-country diverging trends. Across the peripheral member countries 
households’ debt increased at an unsustainable path, while in so-called EZ core – Germany, 
France, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands – households have been fiscally more solid (Table 
3).   
 
Table 3: Households’ Net Saving Rate (1995, 2000 and 2008) 
  1995  2000  2008 












Belgium  16.4  130.4  12.3  107.9  11.5  89.9 
Denmark  0.2  72.6  -4.0  52.4  -2.4  34.2 
Germany  11.0  55.6  9.2  59.7  11.2  66 
Ireland    82.1    37.8  4.0  43.9 
Greece  11.4  97.0  -4.5  103.4  -12.1  99.2 
Spain  10.0  63.3  5.9  59.3  6.1  39.7 
France  12.7  55.5  11.8  57.3  11.6  67.5 
Italy  17.0  121.5  8.4  109.2  8.6  106.1 
Netherlands  14.3  76.1  6.9  53.8  7.0  58.2 
Austria  11.8  68.3  9.2  66.5  12.0  62.6 
Portugal  6.9  61.0  3.8  50.5  -0.9  66.3 
UK  6.7  51.2  0.1  41.0  -4.6  52.0 
Source: AMECO; net savings as % of disposable income; public debt as % GDP 8 
 
Less clear-cut a divide between core and periphery EZ countries can be identified in the financial 
sector, which shows in some way a reversed situation. Table 4 shows the banking exposure of 
Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and Spain toward the so-called PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, 
Greece and Spain). Banks in the EZ core have massively invested in periphery countries. Large 
German current account surpluses vis-à-vis current account deficits of the PIGS, along with the 
latter  low  interest  rates  following  the  creation  of  the  currency  block,  all  lead  to  a  massive 
interconnectedness in the EZ (Baldwin and Gros 2010). This, in turn, increased the vulnerability 
of the EZ banking system. This is one of the critical reasons why the refinancing crisis in Greece, 
which counts for less than 2% of the EZ GDP, opened the way to a systemic crisis of the euro. 
Not only European banks were heavily interconnected. They were also aggressively expanding 
lending and overleveraged.
3 In the last decade the expansion of bank lending was massive: Irish, 
French, Spanish and Italian banks increased their exposition at an unprecedented pace,
4 as shown 
by Table 5. A default in the USA derivatives market could thus have dangerous consequences 
within  the  EU  mainly  through  banks:  strongly  exposed  and  highly  leveraged  banks,  which 
financed weak countries (both governments and private operators), when confronted with the 
danger of externally caused default, would put their domestic debtors under pressure. When these 
events set EZ weak countries in a difficult financial situation, the Euro credibility and stability 
could suffer consequently. This is what actually happened in 2009-2010.  
Table 4: Eurozone Banking Exposure, Eurozone Core Bank’s Holding of GIPS, UK and USA 
Debts (million of US $) 
  Bank Nationality  
Exposure to   Germany   France   Great Britain   Italy   Spain   Other EZ 
countries  
Greece   51.0   111.6   16.5   8.8   1.6   47.9  
Ireland   205.8   85.7   222.4   28.6   16.2   92.5  
Portugal   46.6   49.7   32.4   9.4   108   29.1  
Spain   217.9   244.2   141.7   42.5     200.6  
Source: Bank for International Settlements, consolidated Banking Statistics, End March 2010 
                                                           
3 The high exposition of European banks toward Eastern European markets risked to erode their capital buffer, 
shrinking  further  their  credit possibilities.  Unicredit,  Raiffeisen  group,  Erste  Group  and  OTP  started  to  report 
startling rises in loan losses in early August, due to the substantial amount of bad loans in foreign currencies (e.g. the 
Swiss franc) both to corporate and household borrowers.  
4 In Ireland total bank assets as a percentage of GDP rose from 360% in 2001 to 705% in 2007; in France from 
229% to 373%, in Italy from 148% to 220% and in Spain from 177% to 280%. 9 
 
Table 5: Intra-Eurozone Banking Exposure, EZ Core Banks’ Holding of GIPS Debt 
  1999,  
4th Quarter  
2009,  
4th Quarter  
Percentage change  
1999-2009  
Portugal   26   110   320  
Ireland   60   348   481  
Italy   259   822   217  
Greece   24   141   491  
Spain   94   613   554  
Total   463   2033   340  
Source: Bank for International Settlements, consolidated Banking Statistics, End March 2010 and 
Gros and Baldwin, 2010  
 
The gap between leverage ratios (shareholder equity to total assets)  and regulatory ratios was 
huge (Gros and Micossi 2008). The 13 largest European banks average leverage ratios was 35, 
versus an average of 20 in the US. The average covers big national differences, with French, 
German and British banks more exposed than Italian and Spanish ones, which had been subject 
to a more prudential domestic regulation (Table 6). Moreover, the lack of intra-EZ coordinated 
banking policy worsened already existing imbalances, contributing to the financial vulnerability of 
the largest economies (Baldwin and Gros 2010) as a result of different government responses to 
the problem of toxic assets. For example, French, German and Italian governments’ intervention 
at this regard was very mild.    
In  this  context  of  pre-crisis  financial  institutions’  expansionary  trend,  the  circumvention  of 
regulatory requirements by European financial institutions has been substantial. Along with the 
massive amount of derivatives owned with the aim of alleviating regulatory capital obligations, 
the types of capital assets revealed structural weaknesses. It is worth mentioning the 527 billion 
US dollars of notional exposure of AIGFP’s super senior credit swap portfolio (as December 31, 
2007). Over 300 billion US dollars of credit insurance had been issued for European banks. AIG 
itself  in  the  K-10  annex  of  the  2007  annual  report  defines  those  financial  instruments  as 
‘derivatives written for financial institutions, principally in Europe, for the purpose of providing 
them with regulatory capital relief rather than risk mitigation’. The immediate consequence was 
that AIG’s crisis caused shock waves through the share prices of EU banks, as AIG’s default 10 
 
would have exposed the European banks’ gap of regulatory capital, with dramatic effects on their 
ratings and on the market confidence.
5    
 
Table 6: European Banks’ Leverage Ratio 
    2007  2008  2009 
HYPO REAL ESTATE HOLDING 
  DE  113  n.a.  78.35 
DEXIA  BE  44.1  189.4  58.7 
ING GROUP  NL  55.8  128.5  51 
DRESDNER BANK (2)  DE  41.8  101.2    
DEUTSCHE BANK  DE  69.1  99.5  53.6 
LANDESBANK-BADN-WUERTTEMBERG  DE  43  90.4  43.6 
WESTLEB  DE  66.9  78.6  67.7 
UBS  CH  80.7  71.8  35.3 
BARCLAYS  CB  50.4  55.2  27.6 
BNP PARIBAS  FR  35.4  44.6  30.4 
THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP  GB  43.1  39.4  21.9 
COMMERZBANK  DE  41.4  33.6  36 
HSBC HOLDINGS  GB  23.8  33.5  21.8 
UNICREDIT  IT  26.5  32.1  24.4 
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP  CH  27.8  31  26.4 
KBC GROUP  BE  23.5  30.5  41.24 
BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA  ES  24.4  28.3  22.4 
INTESA SANPAOLO  IT  20.5  26.6  21.4 
BANCO SANTANDER  ES  21.6  26.1  21.3 
Source: Authors’ calculation  
(2) taken over by Commerzbank in 2009 
 
 
The failure of financial and banking regulation in the EZ opened the way to the high fragility of 
the financial system. As Spaventa (2010) highlights, Basel II favored the undercapitalization of 
the banking system and contributed to the unfolding of the financial crisis through four devices: 
low capital coefficients; admission of hybrid capital; lax criteria for risk evaluation; and wide 
possibilities for circumventing the rules. A brief review of the European governments and central 
banks  interventions  in  favor  of  the  banking  system  (table  7)  shows  the  massive  core  EZ 




                                                           
5 As to the structure of EU banks capital, the problems raised in the summer 2010 in Germany by the decision of 
Commerzbank to start halting interest payments on hybrid capital in case of losses are a clear demonstration of the 
confusion at stake as well as of the debt rather than risk nature of this sort of participatory instruments. The ‘profit-
participation certificates’ foresee payment  of fixed interest  only if the bank is  profitable. This  notwithstanding, 
Commerzbank  had  been  paying  interest  on  notes  issued  by  Eurohypo  even  in  case  of  losses.  Moreover,  as 
suspending interest payments was a necessary condition for receiving state bail-outs, problems arose with KBC, 
which considered payments on its hybrid securities mandatory, and RBS, which suspended payments only on some 
of its hybrids. 11 
 
Table 7: Interventions (Governments and Central banks) in favor of the banking system 
in Europe during the current crisis (billion of euros) 
Country  Capital  Guarantee  Other  Total amount  Banks involved 
Austria  7.3  20.2    27.6  8 
Belgium  16.2  20.0  0.2  36.4  6 
Denmark  6.5  14.2  1.0  21.6  23 
France  25.3    0.5  25.8  8 
Germany  40.8  314.4  7.3  362.5  13 
UK  85.6  704.2  2.6  792.5  16 
Greece  2.8  0.5  0.1  3.4  9 
Ireland  10.8  84.2    95.0  6 
Iceland  0.8      0.8  3 
Italy  4.1      4.1  4 
Luxemburg  2.9    0.2  3.1  4 
Netherlands  27.6  52.1  7.5  87.2  13 
Portugal    6.2    6.2  7 
Spain      9.0  9.0  1 
Switzerland  43.7      43.7  1 
Total  274.4  1216.0  28.3  1518.7  115 
Source: ECB, European Commission, National Governments 
 
3.  Diverging Europe? 
 
The  factors  discussed  in  the  previous  section  need  to  be  understood  in  the  frame  of  the 
peculiarities of the EZ, which lead to differential impact of the crisis as well as to an uneven 
economic recovery within the currency block and fuelled a systemic crisis.  
The following three aspects are critical in shaping EZ vulnerability and response to external 
shocks:  a) the distinctive features of European capitalisms; b) the institutional architecture of the 
EZ  which  leads  to  differential  shocks  in  different  countries;  and  c)  the  divergent  economic 
situation of individual countries, which refers particularly to the condition of public and private 
finance and the structure of the economy. 
The  distinct  features  of  European  capitalisms  have  been  only  marginally  affected  by  the 
European integration which, together with globalization, has made the different systems mutually 
compatible  through  a  set  of  shared  rules  and  standards,  but  not  through  clearly  converging 
institutions. The basic institutional features of the EZ can be summarized as follows: 
•  economic  and  commercial  integration  and  flow  of  financial  resources  (freedoms  and 
integrated markets); 
•  common fiscal parameters (Maastricht criteria); 
•  common currency (Euro);  12 
 
•  institutionally separated, open financial markets (with differential rules and taxation); 
•  unintegrated labor markets: rules in the labour market remained national – in spite of the 
will of European institutional architects – due to political and cultural factors and real 
constrains, such as the rigidity of the housing market in many countries. The EU role is 
basically to grant freedom of migration and equal rights of migrants. 
As a matter of fact, the main differences between European forms of capitalism concern the 
financial systems and the labor markets, which remained national competences.  
As far as the financial system is concerned, such variables as the capitalization and liquidity of 
stock markets and the ratio between risk and debt capital are much higher in the USA and UK 
than in continental European markets such as Germany, France and Italy. In the latter, banks are 
more important in financing firms than in the former countries, have a universal nature, and their 
monitoring of and control over firms is stronger (Dietl 1998; Rajan 2010), in spite of significant 
changes in the last two decades. In such a way they are often able to detect early risky situations 
in firms and push them to rescue, thus avoiding default. Although capital re-allocation is slowed 
down, the rapid contagion by financial crises can also be hindered. In this kind of economic 
system, though, the risk of private gain from control, entrenched management, and side dealings 
between banks and firms may be a relatively serious problem and may slow down post-crisis 
recovery.
6 As a matter of fact, European progress towards truly unified financial markets and 
taxation has been bumpy to say the least: the most important European instrument so far has 
been periodical cross-controls by national authorities with some support by the European Union 
on so-called fiscal paradises within the Union and the control that taxpayers pay taxes in the 
country where they reside.  
As to the labor markets, entry and exit flexibility are usually higher in such countries as the USA, 
UK, and Ireland, and seniority relations and firm specific investments are more important in 
continental Europe. Due to these features, European labor markets are usually less reactive to 
financial shocks, thus hindering the contagion of the real economy, although at the price of 
slower labor re-allocation, youth and long-term structural unemployment. 
The  institutional  architecture  of  the  EZ  is  intended  to  create  opportunities  for  European 
countries  and  increase  systemic  resilience  through  an  enlarged  market  and  greater  financial 
                                                           
6 According to Joseph Lutton at JP Morgan (quoted in Rajan 2010, p. 238), ‘the U.S. Federal Reserve started raising 
rates 20 months after peak unemployment in the 1990-91 recession and 12 months after peak unemployment in the 
2001 recession. By contrast, the euro area not only cut rates less but also was quicker to rise rates, doing so 7 months 
after peak unemployment on average in the 1991 recession and 9 months after peak unemployment in the 2001 
recession.’ 13 
 
discipline. However, it also introduced new elements of vulnerability, in particular through the 
decoupling between fiscal and monetary policies and the asymmetry of mobility and flexibility 
between financial and labour markets. The common currency exacerbated both outcomes. 
The institutional asymmetry has to be seen in conjunction with the inherited and new structural 
imbalances, i.e. the imbalances which derive from the economic history of the member countries, 
in particular productivity differentials and the relation between public and private finance. Given 
the  institutional  architecture,  these  imbalances  have  prepared  the  scene  for  problematic  and 
asymmetric adaptation to the global crisis.  
To  work  properly  as  it  was  designed  the  EZ  should  have  complied  with  a  number  of 
requirements. Among the most important are: a) European integration and globalization should 
have been compatible: this aim was largely implemented; b) a common monetary policy should 
have  accompanied  monetary  integration:  a  goal  that was  implemented  successfully,  the  ECB 
having  kept  inflation  around  2%;  c)  common  criteria  for  fiscal  policies  should  have  been 
identified and enforced upon member countries: the Stabilization and Growth Pact (SGP) has 
been repeatedly broken by some of its members, even though the EZ16 as a whole exceeded the 
limit of 3% target only once; d) resources should have flown from strong to weak countries for 
supporting microeconomic convergence: this was a major failure of the integration process, also 
because  the  EU  concentrated  on  macroeconomic  issues;  and  e)  domestic  microeconomic 
adaptation  and  transformation  should  have  been  pursued  with  the  support  of  national 
governments: another major failure. Overall, and in spite of important successes, the integration 
process was  asymmetric to  the  disadvantage  of  the  microeconomic  side as  compared  to  the 
macroeconomic one, thus generating an unbalanced integration. This asymmetry is the most 
critical element of EZ vulnerability, particularly in the long run. 
There is an interrelation among the above successes and failures that contributes to explain the 
external and internal vulnerability of the EZ in front of the international crisis. The monetary 
integration has strengthened the European monetary system, limiting the aggregate vulnerability 
to exogenous shocks of Member States. Smaller states with limited capacity to manage their 
currency  could  rely  on  the  credibility  of  the  Euro  and  the  common  monetary  policy,  while 
financially  weaker  economies  gained  reputation  by  giving  discipline  and  credibility  to  their 
budgets anchored to European shared rules. The monetary integration and the introduction of a 
common  currency  thus  led  to  enlargement  of  markets,  easier  and  smother  internal  flow  of 
resources, elimination of exchange rate risk and uncertainty, and reduction of transaction costs. 
Since monetary integration increased the domestic effect of asymmetric shocks, due to the lack of 
the monetary lever, national sovereignty of fiscal policy was conceived as the main institutional 14 
 
device for national adaptation along with EU budget transfers. The entire system was conceived 
to strengthen national and European resilience to external shocks. 
This  process  of  integration  and  the  EZ  creation,  together  with  globalization,  exposed 
productivity differentials  and made their sustainability hard, at least in the long run.  Indeed, 
traditional  coping  mechanisms  (in  particular,  the  depreciation  of  the  national  currency) 
disappeared.  In  order  to  overcome  these  differentials,  policy-makers  promoted  pro-market 
policies  in  favour  of  profits  since  the  Seventies, thus  causing  growing  distributive  disparities 
which  obtained  additional  peculiar  drivers  within  the  EZ.  They  were  intended  to  provide 
incentives  to  investment  for  fostering  productivity  convergence.  Growing  employment  and 
income  should  have  resulted  through  trickle-down  mechanisms,  thus  boosting  demand  and 
production.  
However, this standpoint disregarded important effects, thus meeting with unforeseen events.  
Indeed, increasing inequalities have reduced the importance of domestic markets, particularly of 
domestically  produced  commodities  consumed  by  the  middle-income  population  and  have 
hampered  opportunities  for  people  in  general  and  potential  entrepreneurs  in  particular  (e.g. 
through the polarization of savings that dried up an important source of diffused, small-scale 
investment). This resulted in segmentation of the economy, the society, and finally the EZ. This 
outcome  had  particularly  disadvantageous  effects  in  laggard  countries.  Segmentation  within 
countries in turn depressed demand, production, and savings and fostered public and private 
debt. Since segmentation was primarily to the disadvantage of the middle class, a politically and 
economically  sensitive  domain,  policies  tried  to  foster  the  trickle-down  mechanisms  by 
supporting the middle-class consumption through different channels (easy credit, particularly for 
consumers  and  housing)  Such  policies  increased  the  countries’  and  economies’  vulnerability. 
Vulnerability,  together  with  non-convergent  fiscal  rules  at  the  European  level,  created  the 
conditions for microeconomic failures hampering macroeconomic convergence and stability. 
In this  frame the crisis  has indeed magnified the gap between the vulnerable peripheral EZ 
member countries and a more resilient core, made up of economies with high private savings, 
low public debt and strong current account surplus, low disparities, high productivity and low 
unemployment. These economies, whose prototype is Germany, are competitive internationally 
and  internally  and  capable  of  affording  microeconomic  reforms  which  further  increase  their 
competitiveness. They can thus implement and sustain financial constraints. On the other hand, 
EZ periphery is undergoing a remarkably severe downturn, which is urgently calling at the time 
of writing for resolute intervention spanning from ‘internal devaluation’, mainly through wage 15 
 
adjustments (Baldwin and Gros 2010), to credible fiscal action and structural reforms (Draghi 
2010), to sovereign default (Rodrik 2010) and debt restructuring (Eichengreen 2011). 
At a general level of analysis, peripheral economies suffer from low or negative savings, low 
productivity (Figure 3) and activity rates (mostly to the disadvantage of women), high disparities 
(Figure 4) and unemployment (with remarkably elevated youth unemployment), rapidly rising 
ratios of debt to gross domestic product, high fiscal and current account deficits and elevated 
interest rates. The specifics differ among Greece, which meets all the aforementioned features, 
Portugal, which has low public and high private debt, Spain, which has low savings and low 
public debt, Ireland, experiencing a bank and financial system crisis hampering financial stability, 
and Italy, which has elevated private savings but suffers from high public debt (Table 8). 
All of them have been unable to comply with structural and microeconomic reforms and to 
implement and sustain financial constraints, and are consequently uncompetitive both externally 
and internally.  
 
Figure 3: Labor Productivity per Hour Worked (EU-15 = 100) 
 










Table 8: Deficit, Current Account, Inflation and Growth in the EZ: 2000-2007 
  Cumulative 















Austria  11.8  13  -4.1  1.014 
Belgium  2.7  26  -1.0  0.002 
Finland  -32.4  50  -5.3  10.5 
France  21.7  4  -3.3  -0.3 
Germany  17.7  26  -4.2  -5.3 
Greece  40.0  -67  8.1  16.6 
Ireland  -11.9  -15  10.0  31.0 
Italy  22.9  -10  1.0  -5.5 
Luxembourg  -18.6  83  4.1  21.2 
Netherlands  4.7  45  2.4  0.2 
Portugal  28.9  -71  6.3  -5.6 
Spain  -2.3  -46  7.6  11.7 
Source:  Baldwin and Gros, 2010 
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When  the  Euro  has  been  introduced  in  1999  (2001  in  Greece),  member  countries  differed 
remarkably in fundamentals as well as in the structure and the dynamism of the economy. The 
working of the EZ has reinforced previous patterns, amplifying divergences rather than easing 
structural convergence. The common currency and monetary policy prevented unbalances to be 
solved  through  currency  depreciation.  At  the  same  time,  common  fiscal  parameters  to  be 
complied with limited significantly the members’ freedom to set fiscal policies. Indeed, in an 
integrated area with common currency only microeconomic reforms are possible and effective to 
improve the performance and competitiveness of individual economies. In particular, economic 
adjustments were meant to be obtained via labour market reform aimed at increasing flexibility 
and lowering real wages. 
In this context, the idea behind free circulation of capital – the risk of countries default being 
equalized thanks to the EU guarantee – is that capital should flow from strong countries to weak 
countries, where interest rates are higher (positive spread). The flow of capital to weak countries 
should re-establish equilibrium and even out interest rates. To this end the EU has established 
the Maastricht criteria to avoid governments’ free-ridings in public finance.
7 These criteria include 
a set of controls and also the possibility of punishment for non-complying countries. 
As aforementioned, however, the equilibrating mechanisms foreseen in the EU build-up did not 
work  properly  (in  particular  because  of  the  lack  of  control  over  fiscal  policies  to  balance 
asymmetric  shocks  and  the  failure  of  microeconomic  reforms).  Yet,  it  turned  to  be  to  the 
advantage of strong countries, in particular Germany,  and to the disadvantage of weak countries. 
Weak countries suffered higher price increases which had effects similar to real exchange rate 
appreciation  and  led  to  export  discouragement.  If  labour  market  reforms  had  worked  as 
expected, compression of wages could have counterbalanced this effect. However, this kind of 
reforms  encounter  two  serious  problems  which  make  them  easier  to  be  pursued  and  more 
successful in stronger economies as Germany than in EZ peripheral member countries. These 
problems are related to the structure of the economy and of the welfare state provisions. First, 
the scope of these reforms is narrower in the periphery, where real wages are lower and social 
services  are  worst.  Compression  of  wages  would  exacerbate  the  negative  consequences  of 
increasing  inequalities  and  jeopardize  labour  incentives  and  productivity.  Second,  the 
consequences  of  focusing  on  downward  wage  flexibility  rather  than  on  investment  in 
infrastructure, research, innovation and human capital in rather static economies with low level of 
technology are,  in  the  long  run,  serious  for  competitiveness  pushing  them  to  choose  labour 
                                                           
7 Compared to a fixed exchange rate system, the common currency area has to solve the critical and potentially 
dangerous problem of avoiding free-riding among member countries to the disadvantage of virtuous ones. 18 
 
intensive and low productivity technologies. Relative costs in the periphery have thus risen for a 
decade, leading to loss of competitiveness in the rather closed EZ real economy where the bulk 
of trade takes place among member countries (Table 9). This situation favored strong countries, 
particularly  German  producers:  their  traditional  competitors  could  not  take  advantage  by 
depreciating their currency. Moreover, the euro has been much more conducive to additional EZ 
exports than a strong Deutsche mark would have been. Strong countries accumulated increasing 
current account surpluses with weaker member countries (Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Current Account Balance (% GDP) 
Source: IMF BOF, in Lapavitsas et al. (2010) 
 
They kept balance of payment equilibrium by exporting capital to weak countries where returns 
were higher, although riskier. The high growth rate in Ireland and Spain has been fuelled by this 
inflow of capital, which, however, went mainly into non tradable activities as construction. The 
gains of the periphery were, as Wolf puts it, transitory, if not illusory (Wolf, 2010).  Strong 
countries’ advantage came at the cost of the weak countries’ inability to comply with common 
fiscal rules, thus increasing systemic risk that, in turn, hit particularly the credibility of strong 
countries.  If  the  EZ  economy  proved  to  be  rather  stable  in  the  short  run,  it  nevertheless 19 
 
progressively  accumulated  tensions.  At  the  basis  there  was  the  inability  to  implement 
microeconomic reforms. 
 
Table 9: Intra EZ Export (% of total export) 
2005   2008  
Belgium   76.4  77.0 
Czech Rep.  84.2  99.4 
Denmark   70.5  69.9 
Germany   63.4  63.7 
Ireland   63.4  68.3 
Greece   52.9  64.0 
Spain   71.8  68.2 
France  62.6  63.0 
Italy  58.6  58.5 
Luxemburg   89.4  89.0 
Netherlands   79.2  78.7 
Austria  69.3  72.3 
Portugal   79.8  73.7 
Finland  56.0  55.9 
Slovenia  66.4  68.1 
UK  56.9  56.9 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
4.  European Sovereign Debt and Euro Crises: the Fork in the Road of the EZ and the 
Risks of Muddling Through 
In A Euro Rescue Plan, a public appeal to the German Federal Government, Franz, Fuest, Hellwig 
and Sinn, four leading German economists directly committed in policy advisory at the Federal 
level, stated that ‘What Europe needs is not an economic government but political and economic 
mechanisms that effectively limit public and private indebtedness in the member states’. In their 
interpretation  the  EZ  crisis  is  ascribable  ‘to  the debt  and  financing  problems  of  some  euro 20 
 
member states’ (Franz, Fuest, Hellwig and Sinn, 2010, p. 101), and the crisis of the euro was a 
‘danger to very specific countries rather than a systemic danger of the euro system as such’ (Sinn, 
2010, p.7).
8 They moreover identify 10 fiscal-policy rules for strengthening national individual 
responsibility, defined in the document as a conditio sine qua non for the survival of the European 
Monetary Union. It is worth recalling rules 9 and 10 here: a majority of the EZ members may ask 
an insolvent country to leave the EZ, and a voluntary exit from the EZ must be possible at any 
time. 
The  main  points  of  this  analysis  are  the  following:  the  EZ  has  always  been  suffering  from 
economic  imbalances  which  burdened  its  development.  In  particular,  the  irresponsible  fiscal 
policies of peripheral countries led to unsustainable level of public – and private – debts and 
fiscal deficit and had pernicious economic spillovers to virtuous countries. Irresponsible policies 
overheated  these  economies,  leading  to  a  huge  flow  of  investments  towards  these  countries 
which inflated bubbles whose bursting hampered EZ sustainability. While the EU was ineffective 
in imposing the respect of the rules designed for avoiding negative spillovers, fiscal stabilization is 
now deemed as badly needed. 
The Authors’ position epitomizes a widespread vision of the dynamics underlying the crisis in the 
EZ. The unprecedented depth and magnitude of the crisis has put the sustainability of the EZ 
institutional and political framework into question. If the urgency of a comprehensive reform is 
widely  acknowledged,  the  direction  that  this  reform  should  take  is  question  of  debate.  The 
necessity of a clear leap forward toward integration is recognized in part of the academic debate. 
Far less clear on this issue are even those policy makers most committed with the European 
project. On the other side, the focus on national interests has sensibly risen since the onset of the 
Greek refinancing crisis. The bulk of European policy makers appear more concerned with the 
reaction of their domestic constituencies than with a EZ coordinated strategy. The discussion is 
shifting  towards  the  evaluation  of  how  costs  are  allocated  and  gains  are  distributed  among 
members in a sort of zero-sum-game logic. The public debt crisis in the periphery of EZ, the 
ECB securities market programme, the bail out of Greece worth 110 billion euros and the Special 
Purpose Vehicle worth 750 billion euros, the bail out of Ireland worth 85 billion euros, all gave 
rise to a harsh political and scientific debate on the working of the EZ and the reform of its 
institutions,  giving fuel to what has been labeled as a new German question. 
                                                           
8 The starting point of their analysis of the EZ crisis is the integration of capital markets which followed the EMU 
and led to a convergence of interest rates in the EZ, regardless the underlying different country risks. This, in turn, 
caused a massive capital flow toward the southwest periphery of Europe. The consequences were threefold: a boom 
in construction and investments in these countries, which ended up in bubbles whose busting is now threatening 
solvency of banks and public finance; the unsustainable level of government deficit.  21 
 
In a context of shrinking budgetary revenues, of fiscal consolidation and of common monetary 
policy, deflation – in particular the cut of wages, pensions and other costs – is addressed as the 
unique,  and  necessary,  adjustment  mechanism  for  deficit  countries.  There  is  widespread 
agreement, as well, in identifying differentials in downward rigidity of labour cost as the critical 
determinant of inflation and competitiveness differentials among member states. Therefore, the 
pillars of post-crisis recovery are identified as fiscal austerity, wage flexibility and regulation. If the 
scientific and policy debate over fiscal austerity is getting more and more momentum in USA and 
Europe,
9 far less momentum seems to have gained in Europe the question of real convergence. 
Yet, two of the more risky countries, Ireland and Spain, have been remarkably disciplined in 
containing  their  debt.  Much  more  than  countries  as  Germany  and  France,  which  broke  the 
Stability and Growth Pact respectively four and three times from 2000 to 2007. The problems do 
not lie in the fiscal behavior of a group of peripheral members, but rather in the different starting 
conditions  of  the  members.  Greece  is  the  only  peripheral  country  which  was  fiscally 
irresponsible, hiding the actual amount of her public debt and deficit. The sovereign debt crises 
of the others is mainly the effect of the public rescue of the financial sector (Figures 6 and 7). 
Governments and central banks interventions in terms of capital and guarantees towards the 
financial sector absorbed respectively the 13%  and the 30% of EU GDP as to December 2009. 
This happened in a context of high pressure on public finance due to the working of automatic 
stabilizers.  
 




                                                           
9 Testified by the extreme position of the so-called generational accountants, a strand of research developed since the 
early 90ies, for example, by Kotlikoff of the Boston University. In this line was the article by Hagist of the Freiburg 
University on Britain fiscal position published by the Financial Times in July 2010. Fiercely faulted by Galbraith, who 
defined them ‘not only  wrongheaded, but also dangerous’  as well as inconsistent in their analysis, generational 
accountants calculate fiscal gap as the difference between the amount the government will be able to collect by 
present and future generations, and the amount it is expected to spend. The figures are therefore much higher than 
those calculated through standard measures. 22 
 
Figure 7: Average government deficit as a percentage of GDP in the Eurozone 
 
 Source: OECD, data neither seasonally nor working days adjusted 
 
This notwithstanding, if ECB engaged since 2008 in massive liquidity provision in order to allow 
overleveraged European banks to adjust their balance sheets, the support to member countries 
suffering speculative attacks on public debt has been slow, encountering fierce opposition by 
Germany.  This  poses  a  weighty  responsibility  to  the  EZ  decision  makers,  especially  in 
consideration of the credit crunch under which peripheral members were seeking extra funds in 
the financial markets. The collapsing of lending put upward pressure on yields. Irish, Greek, 
Portuguese and Italian bond yield spreads vis-à-vis the German bond rose to unprecedented high 
levels  (Figure  8).  Moreover,  as  Krugman  highlights,  a  likely  reason  of  the  loss  of  lenders’ 
confidence has been the very existence of the euro, which implies that troubled countries ‘have to 
deflate their way back to competitiveness, with all the pain that implies’ (Krugman, 2011).  
Moreover, only two years after Lehman Brothers’ default European institutions have started the 
reform of financial regulation.
10 However, the deadlines set, and the lack of any provision for the 
shadow bank system, will leave the financial system highly exposed for long, allowing capital 
migration towards countries with milder regulation and thus hampering efforts of more rigorous 
countries. If the USA asks for more rigorous regulations than Europe, Germany maintains the 
necessity of a longer timeframe in order to sustain her public banks which needed the second 
                                                           
10 The roadmap is made up of four pillars: 1. Capital ratios, defined within Basel III in September 2010 and analysed 
in the subsequent G20 in Seul, which anyway are to be implemented since 2013-2014 and to be fully accomplished 
by 2019; 2. regulation over derivatives, CDS and short sells, presented on the 15 September, which will have to be 
discussed and approved by European and national Parliaments and be into force by 2012; 3. The institutions too big 
to fail; and 4. The shadow bank system. Moreover, minimum standards of leverage ratios and of short term liquidity 
will be defined respectively in 2018 and 2015. 23 
 
biggest public rescue plan (both in terms of capital and of guarantee) in Europe after UK.
11 A 
substantial leap forward in financial market supervision has been made with the establishment of 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB),
12 an independent body responsible for the surveillance of 
the financial system within the Union, and of the three European supervisory authorities (EBA, 
EIOPA  and  ESMA)  which  are  to  ensure  an  improved  prudential  supervision  of  banks, 
insurances and investment firms.
13 These innovations add room for coordination to the still very 
nationally-oriented financial supervision. However, banking and finance regulation could have 
been dealt with in stricter connection with the reform of the economic governance, being the 
vulnerability of sovereigns unavoidably related with that of banks.   




































































As to the economic governance, the European Council endorsed on October 2010 the Report of 
the Task Force chaired by Van Rompuy, established to devise proposals for better budgetary 
discipline and an improved crisis resolution framework (European Council, 2010). Even though 
the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  intend  to  reach  agreement  on  the  Commission’s 
                                                           
11 The German banking association foresees that, following Basel III standards, the 10 biggest banks could need 105 
billion euros of recapitalization. 
12 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24/11/2010 on European   
Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board. 
13 The European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) comprises – along with the ESRB, the European Banking 
Authority  (EBA),  the  European  Insurance  and  Occupational  Pensions  Authority  (EIOPA)  and  the  European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) – the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) 
and competent authorities in the member states. 24 
 
legislative proposals only by Summer 2011,
14 it is nevertheless useful to briefly recall here the 
main features tabled so far. 
The  Report  focuses  on  five  domains:  greater  fiscal  discipline,  new  economic  surveillance 
mechanism,    enhanced  coordination,  robust  framework  for  crisis  management  and  stronger 
institutions for more effective economic governance (Task Force, 2010).  
The  main  focus  remains  fiscal  discipline  further  enhanced,  with  broader  criteria  for  the 
assessment of public finance stability and a wider range of sanctions and measures of  financial,
15 
reputational and political nature in both the preventive and corrective phases of surveillance 
(Task Force, 2010).
16 A greater importance is given to public debt and to the interplay between 
the latter and deficit. Debt surveillance is threefold: a) all countries which don’t meet the target – 
60% of GDP – need to reduce the debt every year at a rate of one twentieth of the excess part; b) 
in the frame of the preventive phase, member countries which exceed the target of public debt 
are to define and implement medium-term budget objectives even if the deficit target is met; and 
c) the level and the dynamic of the debt will play a substantial role in the deficit infringement 
procedures. A reverse majority rule for the adoption of enforcement measures is proposed, in 
order  to  limit  bargaining  processes  and  make  the  operation  of  the  GSP  more  ‘technical’. 
Moreover,  with  the  aim  of  strengthening  institutions,  public  bodies  providing  independent 
analysis,  assessments  and  forecasts  on  domestic  fiscal  policy  matters  are  recommended.  The 
coordination among member countries is enforced through the European Semester, started on 
January 2011 with the aim of simultaneous assessment of both budgetary measures and structural 
reforms fostering growth and employment (Task Force, 2010).  
The provision of a permanent crisis management, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), has 
been foreseen by the Report, agreed by the Euro Area Ministers of Finance in November 2010 
and endorsed by the European Council in December 2010. ESM will be operational as of mid-
2013 following the expiry of the existing European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) and the 
European  Financial  Stability  Mechanism  (EFSM),  with  the  aim  of  supporting  countries  in 
financial distress. Private sector involvement will be decided on a case-by-case basis, in line with 
the IMF practice. 
The need for broadening macroeconomic convergence beyond the budget focus of SGP has 
been  recognized  through  the  provision  of  vulnerability  indicators  to  be  monitored.  A  first 
                                                           
14 COM (2010) 522; COM (2010) 523;  COM (2010) 524; COM (2010) 525;  COM (2010) 526;  COM (2010) 527; all 
adopted on 29 September 2010. 
15  These are interest-bearing deposits and fines. 
16 These are enhanced reporting requirements, ad-hoc reporting to the European Council and enhanced surveillance, 
eventually followed by a public report. 25 
 
assessment  of  a  scoreboard  made  up  of  indicators  as  private  debt,  competitiveness,  current 
account, credit expansion, level of prices, and productivity growth would be followed by in-depth 
analysis  in  case  of  actual  or  potential  excessive  imbalances.  However,  recent  literature  has 
questioned the use of scoreboards (Manasse and Roubini, 2009) and pointed out that some of the 
areas specified should be addressed by European regulation and supervision (Manasse, 2010; 
Spaventa, 2010).  The Report foresees that ‘in particularly serious cases, an ‘excessive imbalance 
position’ should be launched by the Council, with a deadline to take a set of policy measures to 
address the problem. Euro area Member States may ultimately face sanctions in case of repeated 
non-compliance’ (Task Force, 2010, p.2). The infringement procedure appears unlikely to be put 
into practice for a number of reasons, the time lag which reforms encounters to produce effects, 
the  difficulty  of  establishing  targets  in  these  areas,  and  the  lack  of  competences  of  the 
Commission in a substantial number of areas being the most relevant.   
To date the institutional framework of the EZ has been focused on monetary integration and 
common fiscal parameters, leaving to loosely coordinated national initiatives banking and finance 
regulation as well as structural reforms. The latter were however recognized important for the 
smooth working of common monetary policy and should have been harmonized via the Lisbon 
Strategy. Competitiveness policies and current account imbalances were instead completely left to 
the national level. The enhancement of labour flexibility and the adjustment of nominal and real 
wages in order to help absorbing shocks – as long as the increase of retirement age, the decrease 
of average and marginal tax rates and of unemployment benefits – have been for long considered 
the  only  way  ahead  (Trichet,  2007)  for  fostering  productivity  and  labour  utilization  while 
maintaining stable macroeconomic conditions. The pressure of the EZ at this regard has been 
high, exerting a deep influence on national attitudes towards labour policy. Yet, this influence has 
been much wider than the actual European competences would suggest. On the other side, the 
commitment  of  the  EZ  towards  social  protection  has  been  poor  to  say  the  least.
17 
Notwithstanding intense debate on growth and convergence, this structuring doesn’t seem to be 
substantially changed in the reform proposals so far.  
France  and  Germany  are  upholding  a  pact  of  economic  convergence  to  strengthen  the 
competitiveness of European economies. This pact, which is a highly disputed issue at the time 
                                                           
17  For  example,  the  management  of  the  flagship  European  Globalisation  Adjustment  Fund  has  been  since  its 
creation in 2007 unsatisfactory, leading to an embarrassing actual esbursement of euros 140m out of nearly €2bn 
available (just over 5 per cent of total capacity) due to sclerotic bureaucratic procedures, as highligted by Pignal 
(2010). 26 
 
of writing, foresees the removal of automatic indexation of wages to prices, the delay of the age 
of retirement according to demographic developments, the leveling of taxation, development 
instead of binding caps deficit,  mutual recognition of diplomas and professional qualifications, a 
common corporate tax base, national crisis management regime for banks, debt-alert mechanisms 
into their constitutions and the provision of infringement procedures. The bulk of these proposal 
magnify rather than mitigate pro-cyclical adjustments and are tailored according to a ‘German 
model’ of development. As Manasse reminds, fiscal policy should be mildly counter-cyclical in 
order to minimise tax distortions over time and maximise welfare, while the ‘tougher budget cuts, 
the  deeper  the  recession’  (Manasse,  2010).   As  aforementioned,  moreover,  high  pressure  on 
downward flexibility in the labour market as the only way ahead for growth and competitiveness 
encounters risks of increased segmentation and negative effects on the quality of the human 
capital, along with deterioration of standards of living and social unrest.  Strong is the need of 
tackling the real roots of high productivity differentials among member states, and not only fiscal 
consolidation. Not only is convergence of productivity essential for the stabilization of the euro 
in the long run, it is also a necessary condition for the sustainability of a European institutional 
framework.  
The EZ is a highly interconnected monetary union in which the links between members are both 
real and financial. Fiscal policies in each of the countries have systemic implications. Therefore, 
both  surplus  and  deficit  countries,  to  recall  Eichengreen  (2010),  ‘have  the  responsibility  for 
contributing for its stability and smooth operation’. Yet, the Monetary Union, being an extreme 
case  of  fixed  exchange  rate  schemes,  relies  only  on  deficit  countries  for  addressing  trade 
imbalances, thus showing a bias toward deflation. If deficit countries are expected to cut prices 
and wages to curtail trade imbalances, surplus countries are not required to countervail them by 
boosting internal spending. It is the very rationality of EZ institutional setting (institutional and 
policy ‘dualism’), together with diverging interests and the national governments’ myopia, which 
is at the heart – together with the weakness of the European Commission - of the lack of a 
concerted European fiscal response to asymmetric shocks, and namely to the current crisis. This 
fact, being the EU a productively integrated area, hampers the effectiveness of national fiscal 
strategies, and weakens the resilience of the Member states in coping with the global financial 
crisis  and  depression.  It  also  undermines  the  influence  exerted  by  the  EU  response  at  the 
monetary level. 
 It seems that the EU has to return urgently to the old spirit of a positive sum game in a radically 
new context which has now jeopardized mutual trust. What EZ needs are institutional reforms 27 
 
and  policies  based  on  the  acknowledgement  of  the  Member  State’s  interdependence,  and 
coordinated adjustments towards higher balance among members.  In this perspective, critically 
important  is  a  new  credible  pact whereby  strong  member  countries  finance  growth  in weak 
countries in exchange for fair returns and the right of inspection of correct financial management 
through European authorities. This would require, on the one side, to pursue the long-term aims 
of  tackling  productivity  differentials,  supporting  investments  in  infrastructure  and  intangible 
assets, savings and a more balanced pattern of consumption, thus decreasing disparities. On the 
other side, this would entail less formal and static fiscal criteria, which could foster long term 
investments and punish acritical public spending. 28 
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